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I. Introduction
Biometrics is the science of identifying people based on their
physiological and behavioral characteristics.' Modern technology
offers the tantalizing prospect of rapid and accurate identification
using features such as characteristics of the hand, patterns in the eye,
and facial geometry. Although biometric science could revolutionize
the process of identification, it also raises concerns that should be
considered as we enter into more widespread use of the technologies.
Concerns about biometrics are particularly important in light of
the federal government's project to implement biometric technologies
at all points of entry by the end of 2004. Following a Congressional
mandate, all visas for entry into the United States must include
biometric data by October 26, 2004.'
Technological and diplomatic challenges will prevent full
implementation by the October deadline.3 Nevertheless, the federal
initiative is proceeding at a rapid pace. The Department of Homeland
Security expects to have fingerprint and face scanners in place at 115
airports by January of 2004.' These systems will collect biometric
information from all visitors coming through immigration, data which
will be checked against a terrorist watch list. The government expects
to have fingerprint and face scanners in place in all airports and sea
ports by the end of 2004, with land crossings included within the next
5few years.
Much of the discussion surrounding implementation of biometric
technology involves developing rules to ensure reliability of the
systems and create appropriate restrictions on the use of the data.6
This article argues, however, that regardless of how much we invest in
establishing standards for reliability of the technology and protections
of the data from fraud or improper use, no system will be foolproof.
Biometric determinations will be subject to mistakes, fraud, and
1. See H.R. Subcomm. on Domestic and Intl Monetary Policy of Comm. on Banking
and Financial Services, Hearings on Biometrics and the Future of Money, 105th Cong. 6
(May 20, 1998) [hereinafter Biometrics and the Future of Money] (statement of Jeffery S.
Dunn, Chairman of Biometrics Consortium).
2. See Brian Bergstein, U.S. Now Demanding Biometric Technology, AP -
Technology (Aug. 25, 2003) (available in 2003 WL 62376790).
3. See id.
4. Deborah Charles, U.S. Unveils High-Tech Foreign Registration Program, Reuters
<http://www.reuters.comnewsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=370741 1> (Oct. 28,
2003).
5. See id.; Bergstein, supra n. 2.
6. See, e.g., sources cited infra n. 93.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [25:653
EMERGING IMPLEMENTATION OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY
abuse through human and technological error, both intentional and
inadvertent. As a result, we should take this opportunity to develop
methods for individuals to review and challenge biometric
determinations. In particular, the article suggests a doctrinal
framework for challenges to biometric determinations made by
administrative agencies.
At the most basic level, biometric data is simply data. Its
collection, therefore, raises the same concerns we have when the
government or private groups collect any data. Given that other
symposium presenters will discuss data collection and data mining in
general, I will focus primarily on 1) describing issues that might cause
greater concern in the case of collection of biometric data than in the
case of collection of other personal identification data, such as
addresses or social security numbers, and 2) proposing a framework
particularly appropriate for biometrics.
II. Biometric Technology and Uses
A. Overview
Biometric technology uses automated methods for recognizing a
person based on physiological or behavioral characteristics
Fingerprints are the most commonly used and widely accepted form
of biometric data. Other biometric technologies currently in use are
based on hand and finger geometry, eye scans, facial imaging, and
speaker recognition. Techniques under investigation include
identification by vein patterns, gait, sweat pores, body odor, and brain
8
waves.
Biometrics can be used in two ways: 1) to verify that people are
who they say they are and 2) to identify unknown people.9 For
example, suppose someone arrives at an access point claiming to be
John Doe. An automated system can analyze the biometrics of the
person trying to enter and compare it to biometric information about
7. See Biometrics and the Future of Money, supra n. 1, at 4.
8. See John D. Woodward, Jr., Nicholas M. Orlans, & Peter T. Higgens, Esoteric
Biometrics, in Biometrics 115, 115-136 (Jane K. Brownlow, ed., McGraw-Hill 2003); Anil
K. Jain, Ruud Bolle, & Sharath Pankanti, Introduction to Biometrics, in Biometrics:
Personal Identification in Networked Society 1, 10-11, 13 (Anil K. Jain, et al., eds., Kluwer
Academic Publishers 1999).
9. See Samir Nanavati, Michael Thieme, & Raj Nanavati, Biometrics: Identity
Verification in a Networked World 12-14 (2002); Richard E. Smith, How Authentication
Technologies Work, in Biometrics 3, 7 (Jane K. Brownlow, ed., 2003).
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John Doe already in the database. This process is known as
verification, or one-to-one matching.'"
In contrast, identification, or "one-to-many" matching, requires
the system to read a person's biometrics and scan a large database to
find a match." An FBI search for a fingerprint match found at a crime
scene would be an example of identification. Technologically, it is
much easier to verify who you claim to be with reasonable accuracy
than to identify an unknown person. In particular, only fingerprints
and retinal scanning have been shown in independent tests to scan
databases containing more than 1,000 entries, although other
technologies could develop to that point."
Most biometric systems operate by translating information about
a human feature into a mathematical construction. The mathematical
construction has no physiological meaning. Rather, the information
developed by the computer is only indirectly related to physiological
features.
Consider a hypothetical attempt to develop a formula for
comparing noses. A direct comparison would take physiological
measurements of a particular person's nose, such as the length of the
bridge, the size of the nostril opening, and the width of the tip. The
computer would store the information, take measurements again
when the subject returns, and compare the two. The identity would be
verified only if enough of the information matched. One could also
imagine a system taking an initial image, like a photograph, of the
nose. When the subject appears for verification, the system would
superimpose the second image over the first, detecting variations in
the physical measurements.
Current automated biometric systems do not work in this way at
all.'3 Rather, the systems are based on developing mathematical
formulas to detect statistically significant correlations among the
10. Smith, supra n. 6, at 8. One-to-one matching also may be written as (1:1).
11. See id. at 7-8. One-to-many matching also may be written as (1:N).
12. See H.R. Subcomm. on Domestic and Intl Monetary Policy of Comm. on Banking
and Financial Services, Hearings on Biometric Identification and the Financial Services
Industry, 105th Cong. [3] (May 20, 1998) (statement of James L. Wayman, Director, U.S.
national Biometric Test Center). Independent testing, at least up until 1998, has shown
that facial geometry, speaker recognition and hand geometry are not capable of
identifying an individual from a database of greater than 1,000.
13. The problem with a hypothetical direct comparison system can be described in
terms of not enough variation and too much variation. Human noses may not vary enough
to allow identification or verification through simple, direct measurements. In addition,
the information must be grouped in some way that allows efficient processing. Too much
undifferentiated information is unmanageable.
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elements of abstracted patterns of human characteristics.'4 Consider
again the hypothetical project to develop a nose biometric. System
developers could begin by extracting a mathematical representation
of the noses of a sample of the population. The representation would
not be an actual image of the people in the database. Rather the nose
scanning device could scan to create a one-dimensional pattern
representation of the elements of the noses."
Once the pattern information has been extracted, developers
would run computer analyses of the data set made up of the patterns
of all of the people in the population sample, trying to find
relationships in the patterns that would consistently allow
differentiation of individual noses from the group. That relationship
could be expressed, for example, as a formula which takes the
derivative of the relationship between the mathematical abstraction
of one part of the pattern and another part of the pattern. In other
words, one might find that washing the pattern data through the
formula consistently yields a result that allows us to distinguish
individual noses from the group. The formula, or algorithm, would
provide the basis for determining whether the nose of the person
requesting access has a high correlation with the nose of the person
enrolled in the system. In sum, biometric systems generally are based
on algorithms that analyze abstracted pattern representations of
human characteristics.
B. Individual Technology and Uses
Fingerprinting, based on comparing the graphical, flow-like
ridges of the fingers, is the oldest and most familiar biometric. 6
Fingerprinting techniques appeared in scientific literature as early as
the seventeenth century, and the use of a fingerprint to identify a
criminal suspect can be traced to the 1870s."7
14. See Jain et al., Introduction to Biometrics, supra n. 8, at 1, 21. For a classic,
technical explanation of pattern recognition, see Keinosuke Fukunaga, Introduction to
Statistical Pattern Recognition (2d ed., Academic Press, New York 1990).
15. For example, retinal scanning devices do not take images of the retina, but rather
scan the retina in a circle to create a one-dimensional pattern. See Robert "Buzz" Hill,
Retina Identification, in Biometrics: Personal Identification in Networked Society 123, 126-
27 (Anil K. Jain, et al., eds. 1999).
16. See Peter T. Higgins, Fingerprint and Hand Geometry, in Biometrics 45, 45 (Jane
K. Brownlow, ed., 2003); Anil K. Jain, Lin Hong, Sharath Pankanti, Ruud Bolle, An
Identity-Authentication System Using Fingerprints, 85 Proceedings of the IEEE 1365, 1367
(Sep. 1997).
17. See Jain, et al., supra n. 16, at 1367-68; Higgins, supra n. 16, at 45-47. While
serving as a missionary doctor in Japan in the 1870s, Dr. Henry Faulds became interested
in fingerprint impressions embedded in ancient pottery. His interest led him to take
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The FBI currently has tens of millions of fingerprints in its
database.18 The system can provide a match for fingerprints taken
from a suspect at the time of an arrest in less than two hours. 9 The
use of fingerprinting technology, however, is not limited to criminal
investigation. The majority of fingerprint searches conducted by the
FBI are for employee background checks." In addition, fingerprint
identification is used by a variety of private commercial enterprises
and regulatory agencies including commercial check cashing entities,
state motor vehicle departments and notaries.2
Facial imaging technology describes a group of different
approaches designed to reduce facial qualities to mathematical
abstractions that can be captured and evaluated electronically. The
technologies vary in terms of the types of information analyzed and
the method of analysis. The term "Eigenfaces," for example, refers to
a broad class of algorithms that represent and compare individual
faces by reference to abstracted images of archetypal faces.22 The
process includes subtracting the abstracted representations of an
average face from the abstracted representations of the particular
face being enrolled to create mathematical variants.23
All of the facial imaging technologies work best with a well-lit
frontal image, such as a mug shot, rather than images extracted from
faces in a moving crowd. 4 Government testing suggests a 75-80
percent accuracy rate in stationary, frontal-image tests designed to
simulate real-world conditions, with a higher accuracy rate under
ideal conditions.25 Critics charge, however, that even the 75-80percent
samples of fingerprints from his students. When a beaker of alcohol was stolen from his
lab, Faulds used the fingerprint samples to identify one of his students as the culprit. See
id.
18. Id. at 55.
19. Id.
20. Vance C. Bjorn, An Introduction to Privacy and Security Considerations of
Biometrics Technology, 701 PLI/Pat. 105, 107 (2002).
21. See Alexander T. Nguyen, Here's Looking at You, Kid: Has Face-Recognition
Technology Completely Outflanked the Fourth Amendment?, 7 Va. J.L. & Tech 2, 3 (2002)
(noting fingerprint requirements for receiving welfare, driver's licenses, and cashing
checks); Juan Espinosa, Businesses May Require Fingerprint to Cash Checks, Knight-
Ridder Tribune Bus. News (Dec. 7, 2001).
22. See Nicolas Orlans, Facial and Voice Recognition, in Biometrics 71, 75 (Jane K.
Brownlow, ed., 2003).
23. See David Shenk, Watching You: The World of High-Tech Surveillance, 204 no. 5
Nati. Geographic 3, 18 (Nov. 2003).
24. See Nanavati et al., supra n. 9, at 70; Orlans, supra n. 22, at 73.
25. See Nanavati et al., supra n. 9, at 76.
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rate is high given that real-world conditions are more challenging
than any form of simulation.26
Despite the added difficulties of scanning faces moving in a
crowd, facial imaging technology was used during the Super Bowl in
January of 2001. Cameras equipped with facial imaging software
scanned individual faces in the stadium, attempting to match the data
against known criminals.27 No arrests were reported.28
Similarly, a crowd scanning project in Tampa, Florida, produced
disappointing results. For two years, the Tampa police department
used cameras distributed in a section of the town and equipped with
facial imaging software to capture images of passing faces. The images
were compared to a database of 30,000 fugitives, runaways, and
sexual predators. 29 The project was terminated in August of 2003 after
failing to yield a single positive identification."
The Department of Motor Vehicles in West Virginia also has
used facial imaging technology to try to prevent driver's license
fraud.3" Photos of new applicants are compared to a database of
photos of existing license holders, and the applicant is challenged
when there is a discrepancy.32 Six thousand licenses have been denied
in the first five years of operation.33
Although the West Virginia DMV considers the number of
denials a mark of the amount of fraud avoided,34 this may be an
overbroad interpretation of the data. The raw numbers do not
establish how much fraud was deterred as opposed to how many
errors occurred.
26. See id.
27. See Nguyen, supra n. 21, at 2.
28. See id.
29. All Things Considered, "Robert Siegel Interview: Captain Bob Guidara Discusses
the Failure of the Security Surveillance System Tested in Ybor City to Make a Single
Positive Identification in Two Years" (Natl. Public Radio Aug. 20, 2003) (news broadcast).
30. Id.
31. Natalie Smith, Putting a Finger on Biometrics, 7 MOVE Magazine 2
<http://www.aamva.org/products/Move/archive/proPublicationsMOVESummer2002
FingerOnBiometrics.asp> (Summer 2002).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. For example, the Director of Information for the West Virginia DMV suggested
that the raw numbers are reflective of the amount of fraud deterred:
Morgan says the facial recognition system is doing a good job of preventing
fraud. 'So far, we've refused or denied about 6,000 licenses. When we tell
people their photos don't match, they go to the car to 'get something' and they're
gone ....
See id.
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In the aftermath of September 11 terrorist attacks, the American
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators announced plans to
require that all drivers' licenses contain a fingerprint or digital photo
that could be electronically scanned into a state, cross-jurisdictional
database. 5 This is a separate initiative from the federal project to
enroll data from foreign visitors described in the opening of the
article.
Hand geometry technology creates mathematical pattern
abstractions using data derived from the length, width, thickness,
curvature, and surface area of the hand and four fingers.36 The quality
of the enrollment image will affect how often the system falsely
rejects the individual in the future, and proper enrollment may
require that the user learn the feel of the system. For example, users
may be told to imagine landing an airplane as they place their hand
on the platen." Hand geometry technologies are designed for
verification that a person is who they are claiming to be rather than
for identification through "one-to-many" matching.38
Although less accurate than fingerprints, hand geometry systems
are relatively easy to use and, thus, are used more than any biometric
system other than fingerprinting.39 For example, more than 90% of
the nation's nuclear facilities use hand geometry readers to validate
entry,' Disney World uses a two-finger geometry system to verify its
season pass holders,4" and the San Francisco International Airport
42uses hand geometry to control access to the tarmac.
Eye Scanning is the final biometric technology currently in use.
Although eye scanning frequently appears in Hollywood movies with
futuristic settings, 3 the technology is far from fictional. Modem
35. See Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National
Identification Systems, 15 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 319, 328 (2002).
36. Richard L. Zunkel, Hand Geometry Based Verification, in Biometrics: Personal
Identification in Networked Society 87, 89 (Anil K. Jain, et al., eds. 1999).
37. See id. at 91.
38. See id. at 87.
39. See Higgins, supra n. 16, at 65, 69.
40. See H.R. Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, and Govt. Info. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary: Hearing on Biometric Identifiers and the Modern Face of Terror:
New Technologies in the Global War on Terrorism: 107th Cong. 12, 42 (2001) [hereinafter
Biometric Identifiers] (Statement of Martin Huddart, general Manager, recognition
Systems, Inc., Ingersoll-Rand).
41. See Higgins, supra n. 16, at 67-68.
42. John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the
Concerns-Drafting the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 97, 106 (1997).
43. See, e.g., Never Say Never Again (Warner Brothers 1983) (motion picture);
Mission: Impossible (Paramount Pictures, 1996) (motion picture); Charlie's Angels
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technology has offered both iris and retinal scanning, although retinal
scanning systems are no longer commercially available.
An iris scan uses an infrared light to identify and create
mathematical abstractions of patterns in the colored tissue around the
center of the eye." Current commercial iris scanning systems works at
a range of about 3 to 7 inches, although some research systems may
operate at a range of 5 meters.45 The verification time can be as fast as
4 seconds in practice.4'6 Enrollment in the system is more difficult than
enrollment for systems such as fingerprint, face scanning or hand
geometry. The eye must be properly positioned and focus held during
the scan.47
Retinal scanning is similar, but analyzes the patterns of veins
occurring in the back of the eye.48 Both eye scanning techniques deter
some types of fraud because it is difficult to change one's iris or
retinal patterns, short of the fictional technology depicted in the
movie "Minority Report," although other forms of subterfuge may
exist
49
Virgin Atlantic and British Airways use the EyeTicket Jetstream
System to rush frequent transatlantic passengers past the passport
check." John F. Kennedy International Airport has installed an iris
scan system for employee access to restricted areas. In a fascinating
use of the iris scan, National Geographic took a famous photograph of
(Columbia, 2000) (motion picture); X-Men (Twentieth Century Fox, 2000); Minority
Report (Twentieth Century Fox, 2002) (motion picture).
44. John Daugman, Iris Recognition, 89 no. 4 Am. Scientist 1 (Jul.-Aug. 2001);
Richard P. Wildes, Iris Recognition: An Emerging Biometric Technology, 85 Proceedings
of the IEEE 1348 (Sep. 1997).
45. Nicolas Orlans, Eye Biometrics: Iris and Retina Scanning, in Biometrics 89, 91
(Jane K. Brownlow, ed., 2003).
46. Id. at 93-94.
47. See Wildes, supra n. 44, at 1351, 1353 (noting that the person enrolling must
properly position the eye and describing the need to maintain a steady gaze). In addition,
some test subjects report discomfort from the light. See id. at 1361.
48. Orlans, supra n. 45, at 95.
49. See John Daugman, Recognizing Persons by Their Iris Patterns, in Biometrics:
Personal Identification in Networked Society 123, 126-27 (Jain, et al., eds. 1999) (describing
countermeasures against subterfuge). In addition, disease or injury like hemorrhaging,
glaucoma or occlusion may change the patterns. See Orlans, supra n. 45, at 95.
50. Sean Henahan, The Eyes Have It <http://www.accessexcellence.org/WN/SU/
SU102001/irisscan.html> (Jun. 17, 2002).
51. Terminal 4 JFK International Airport, JFK IAT & Port Authority Unveil Iris
Scan Security Solution <http://www.jfkiat.com/Documents/Latest%20Newsoct/iris%20
scan.htm> (accessed Nov. 15, 2003).
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an Afghan girl with haunting eyes and used iris scanning to identify
the girl 18 years later.52
III. Implications of Biometric Technology
Using biometrics, particularly for verification purposes, offers
great advantages over current methods in terms of convenience,
accuracy and security. Instead of remembering ten passwords and
changing them every month, one could simply put a finger on a platen
connected to the computer.53 Instead of harried airline employees
squinting at a driver's license photo taken five years and twenty
pounds ago, airlines could adopt a biometric measure to more
precisely confirm that the person entering the airport or getting on a
plane is the person listed in the documents and is not among those
considered a security risk. Leaving your driver's license or ATM card
at home by mistake would no longer matter because your biometrics
measurements are a part of you and go wherever you go."
Biometric technology also is appealing from a security
standpoint.55 Accessing funds from the ATM using a thumbprint
instead of a card or password enhances security given that a thief
would have a harder time stealing your thumbprint than your ATM
card.
There is a temptation, however, to romanticize the security and
accuracy of biometric technology. In extolling the virtues of
biometrics, for example, Senator Dianne Feinstein declared that
biometric identifiers are the most secure and convenient form of
authentication because "they cannot be borrowed, stolen, forgotten
52. Henahan, supra n. 50; see also Cathy Newman, A Life Revealed, 201 no. 4 Natl.
Geographic 8 (Apr. 2002) (excerpt available at <http://magma.nationalgeographic.com/
ngm/afghangirl/>); David Braun, How They Found National Geographic's "Afghan Girl",
National Geographic News <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2002/03/0311_
020312_sharbat.html> (March 7, 2003) (describing how the National Geographic team
located the girl from the photo and verified her identity).
53. Inexpensive devices are available currently to control access to computers
through fingerprints. See Biometrics and the Future of Money, supra n. 1, at 48 (statement
of Oscar R. Pieper, President, Indicator technology) (describing a computer mouse with a
fingerprint reader for less than $100).
54. See id at 7 (statement of Mr. Dunn). Citibank is already looking into the
feasibility of implementing a fingerprint or face scanning system for ATMs. See Lucas
Mearian, Toppling the PIN: Banks eye Biometrics for A TM Access
<http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,67314,00.html>
(Jan. 11, 2002).
55. Nanavati et al., supra n. 9, at 4 (2002); Woodward, supra n. 42, at 101.
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or forged."56 Despite the glowing praise, biometrics are neither
perfectly secure nor perfectly accurate.
No biometric technique is completely accurate. 7 For facial scans,
different lighting, background composition, or odd angles may cause
a mistake in identification. 8 Eye scans require the eye to be
positioned perfectly to avoid an error. 9 Although a finger scan is
generally reliable, it may be misread at different angles or pressures.60
Moreover, the general question of reliability should be broken down
more specifically into consideration of false positives and false
negatives, given that the policy implications may differ. For example,
consider the results of one iris scan system test. In 878 attempts, the
system being tested did not once admit someone who was not the
person enrolled with the iris scan data. The test, however, produced
89 false rejects, in which the system refused to accept someone who
did match the data. From a policy standpoint, the low level of false
accepts suggests that the system strongly addresses security concerns
by consistently rejecting those who did not belong. On the other
hand, the considerable level of false rejects could foreshadow
inconvenience, frustration and improper denial of access for many.
The question of whether the system is reliable enough to implement
may turn on policy choices concerning which goals are paramount
and which goals are expendable.
In addition, there has been little testing of the accuracy of many
types of biometrics outside laboratory conditions, and it is difficult to
create statistically significant trials of sufficient variations in the
laboratory.6' For example, accuracy results of a fingerprint system for
a population of elderly people in a dry environment may vary from
the accuracy results for a population of young people in a humid
environment.62 Similarly, the accuracy rate of a facial imaging system
may vary tremendously when tested against those actively trying to
conceal their appearance as opposed to those who are trying to be
56. See Biometric Identifiers, supra n. 40, at 2 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
57. See Nanavati et al., supra n. 9, at 23-41 (chapter discussion on accuracy in
biometric systems); John D. Woodward, Jr. Searching the FBI's Civil Files: Public Safety v.
Civil Liberty, in Biometrics 307, 324 (Jane K. Brownlow, ed., 2003).
58. See Nanavati et al., "Factors Affecting False Nonmatch Rates," supra n. 9, at 30-
31 tbl. 3.1.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 23 (noting that Disney World's use of finger geometry would have been a
good real-world study of accuracy, but that the results of that study are classified).
62. Bjorn, supra n. 14, at 111.
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recognized for access.63 In a recent demonstration of the problem,
National Geographic magazine asked a former CIA operative to try
to fool a facial imaging system using techniques such as glasses, facial
hair and head positioning.' When the system tried to match the
operative's current photo against various types of disguised images,
the level of correlation ranged from roughly 60 percent to 80
percent.65 The results were even worse when the system tried to make
the match using a photograph from 27 years before. In that case, the
level of correlation between the old photo and the operative's
undisguised face was only 19 percent and the level of correlation
between the old photo and various facial disguises ranged from 8
percent to 12 percent.66
And finally, the accuracy of any computer system is only as good
as the individuals who operate and maintain the system. 67 Human
error, undoubtedly, will be an additional source of mistake and
confusion.
In addition to the possibility of a mistake, biometric technology
cannot eliminate the possibility of fraud. The computers that collect
and evaluate biometric information are vulnerable to the same type
of fraud and manipulation as other computers.' The biometric
information housed in the computer could be accessed and erased,
altered, or copied. In theory, programs could be written to circumvent
the system. Moreover, the fraud need not be based on sophisticated
63. Id.
64. Shenk, supra n. 23, at 18-19.
65. See id. at 19.
66. See id.
67. As engineer and social scientist Donald Norman notes, "In the end, security
depends upon people. You can have the most powerful encryption in the world, but the
weak link is the systems, procedures, and people who implement them." Don Norman's
jnd.org: Recommended Readings <http://www.jnd.org/recommended-readings.html>
(accessed Dec. 1, 2003) (reviewing Bruce Schneier, Secrets & Lies: Digital Security in a
Networked World (John Wiley & Sons 2000)).
68. Data, of course, can be stolen or misappropriated without sophisticated hacking
programs. For example, in November of 2003, a thief who stole a laptop computer also
netted the names, addresses, and social security numbers of thousands of Wells Fargo
Bank customers. David Lazarus, A Simple Theft Nets Wells a World of Woe: Break-In
Behind Bar Puts Clients' Data at Risk, San Francisco Chronicle Al (Nov. 21, 2003),
available at <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2003/11/21/MNGLT37M
H71.DTL>. The laptop belonged to an outside consultant working for the bank. Id.
Similarly, in October of 2003, a woman in Pakistan, who was doing outsourced clerical
work for UCSF Medical Center, threatened to release patient files onto the internet unless
the hospital helped her collect outstanding funds owed to her by her employer. David
Lazarus, San Francisco Chronicle, Pakistani threatened UCSF to get paid, she says
<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/11/12/BUG152V
MQR1.DTL> (Nov. 12, 2003).
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computer technology. Crude approaches already exist to manufacture
or avoid a fingerprint match.69 More sophisticated methods of
biometrics fraud may develop as the technology becomes more
widespread.
The fact that biometrics data can be faked, however, is not a
complete indictment of the technology. It is still harder to steal and
reproduce your iris scan than it is to steal and reproduce your
mother's maiden name.
The real problem is not that biometrics are subject to fraud or
error, but our conviction nonetheless in its accuracy. Human beings
have an almost blind faith in all things scientific," and biometric data
is cloaked in the mantle of scientific truth. Thus, if a computer tells a
government agent that a person's retinal scan matches that of a
notorious criminal or someone who should be denied access to a
building or a plane or a country, it will be very difficult for the person
to argue the computer is mistaken. In other words, the problem lies
not in the possibility of mistake about who we are, but rather the
physical and psychological barriers to challenging a mistake about
who we are.71
More important, the relevant question may not be who you are,
but what you might have done or might do. The ability to accurately
identify an individual does not mean that we necessarily know what
acts the individual has committed or might commit. The danger is that
our belief in our ability to identify people with great accuracy will
cloud our judgment about what one has done or what one is likely to
69. European refugees have been known to soak their hands in henna so that their
fingerprints will be harder to detect. Moreover, studies have shown thin fingerprint pads
adhered to the fingers have managed to fool scanners. See Higgins, supra n. 16, at 64; see
also Valorie S. Valencia & Christopher Horn, Biometric Liveness Testing, in Biometrics,
139, 139-149 (Jane K. Brownlow, ed., McGraw-Hill 2003) (describing anecdotal and lab
evidence related to whether fingerprint reading technology can be fooled by something
other than a live person's finger on the plate).
70. Cf. James L. Wayman, When Bad Science Leads to Good Law: The Disturbing
Irony of the Daubert Hearing in the Case of U.S. v. Byron C. Mitchell
<http://www.engr.sjsu.edulbiometrics/publicationsdaubert.html> (Feb. 2, 2000)
(commenting on probability-based arguments that are unfounded and misleading to the
jury, and noting that there is a history in American jurisprudence of human identification
based on the gross misuse of statistical and probability theory).
71. It is possible that the problem can be traced to our lack of experience with
biometrics. Over time and through unpleasant experiences, we could, in theory, develop a
healthy suspicion of biometrics. A significant number of individuals, however, could be
trampled in the process of our experiential learning.
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do.72 We may transpose our certainty about identity into a certainty
about a person's past or future behavior. The difficulty of challenging
a false biometric reading and the potential for improper assumptions
based on biometric readings are particularly troubling given the
settings in which biometrics are likely to be used. Much biometric
technology is likely to be used by government agencies in settings
such as licensing and access, settings that may not provide the same
type of due process protections as criminal investigations. Similarly,
the technology may be used for verification and identification of
citizens of foreign countries, who are not afforded the same level of
rights as U.S. citizens Finally, biometric technology will be used in
private commercial settings, in which individuals as a general matter
do not enjoy the same types of process rights as they would in relation
to government action, short of specific consumer legislation.
In short, despite the greater accuracy and reliability of biometrics
than other forms of verification and identification, the technology
raises concerns related to the barriers of challenging mistake and
fraud as well as the unfortunate potential to make false assumptions
based on the biometric results. Assuming we can overcome concerns
about inaccuracies, improper assumptions and bias towards things
scientific, the use of biometrics also raises concerns of reinforcing
societal prejudices and denying fundamental notions of individual
identity.73
Historically, biologic differences such as race, sex and skin color
have been used to categorize people into groups and discriminate
against them based on those categories. To the extent that
widespread use of biometric technology promotes such
categorization, it may contribute to our unfortunate tendency as a
society to judge people by including them in biologic groups and
making assumptions about those groups. There is a danger that the
more we focus on biologic characteristics, the less we remember the
intangible aspects of a person's character. As a result, perhaps we
should be wary of moving towards a society that constantly reduces us
to our biologic characteristics.
As mentioned above, biometrics are merely a form of data. Thus,
collection of biometric data raises some of the same issues that arise
72. Problems related to scientific evidence are not confined to biometrics. We
already worry about whether juries can distinguish between the accuracy of scientific
evidence and whether the evidence proves anything.
73. Sobel, supra n. 35, at 320 (arguing that national identification systems transform
intrinsic qualities about individuals into numeric designations such that our personhood
becomes an attribute of bureaucratic computerized systems).
[25:653HASTINGS COMM/ENT LTJ
EMERGING IMPLEMENTATION OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY
when government agencies or private firms collect any information
about citizens. Such concerns include whether information about a
citizen should be afforded some degree of protection under privacy
doctrines or doctrines related to freedom of speech and association.74
Although other panelists will address issues related to data
collection and data mining in general, it is worth noting two issues
that relate specifically to collection of biometric data. First, some
commentators express concern that biometric data could potentially
reveal information about health status.75 Such concerns are based on
the notion, for example, that examining a person's iris or retina could
possibly show evidence of various health conditions such as
pregnancy or hypertension. 6 Similarly, some researchers have
suggested a link between fingerprint patterns and male
homosexuality, but the data, as well as the conclusions drawn from
the data, are controversial.77
It would take a significant technological shift, however, to go
from current biometric systems to systems that reveal disease or other
health information. As described above, current biometric systems do
not operate as a human observer would, but rather translate
information into a mathematical construction that has no
physiological meaning.78 Retinal scanning devices, for example, do not
take an image of the retina. They scan the retina in a circle to create a
one-dimensional pattern.79 Such abstracted information does not
reveal collateral health status.'
It is possible that different approaches to biometric technology
could develop in the future. In that case, we might need to harmonize
rules regarding the collection and use of biometric data with rules
regarding the collection and use of health information.8
74. For an exploration of Constitutional issues related to data collection in general,
see id. (exploring the implications of a national identification system); Christopher
Slobogin, Symposium: Public Privacy, Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right
to Anonymity, 72 Miss. L. J. 213 (2003); see also Greg Star, Airport Security Technology: Is
the Use of Biometric Identification Technology Valid Under the Fourth Amendment?, 20
Temp. Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 251 (2002).
75. See Woodward, supra n. 42, at 115-117 (1997).
76. Id. (quoting Dr. Harold Chen, Medical Genetics Handbook 221-226 (1988)).
77. Id. at 117.
78. See supra nn. 13-16 and associated text.
79. See Hill, supra n. 15.
80. See Orlans, supra n. 22, at 98 (noting that retinal scanning is not inherently prone
to privacy abuse because a special process called angiography is needed to scan for
medical conditions that biometric retinal scanning would not be able to reveal).
81. For example, Congress, with the Amendments to HIPAA, has implemented
privacy restrictions that require elaborate consent before health information can be
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Second, biometric technology raises for many people the specter
of government tracking. It creates the fear that government, by
constant collection of biometric data, will be able to monitor
substantially all of our movements from day to day. Tracking is no
more than data processing, however, and it could be accomplished
without biometrics. For example, if individuals are required to enter
passwords or social security numbers often enough for computer
access, building access, and credit access, and the government has the
ability to collate the data, the government could track substantially all
of an individual's movements from day to day without ever collecting
biometrics.
Biometric data creates an additional level of tracking concern
only if the data can be obtained surreptitiously. For example, entering
passwords and social security numbers requires a citizen's knowledge
and participation to physically enter the information into a data
collection device.83  In theory, information about a person's
physiological and behavioral characteristics could be collected
without their knowledge or consent. If this were true, such biometric
technology could substantially facilitate tracking, beyond the
capabilities of other identification technology.
In order to accomplish this, the government would need the
capacity to both surreptitiously collect biometric data and scan large
data bases for "one-to-many" identification. Current biometric
technology lacks the sophistication necessary to facilitate such a
process. As described above, only fingerprints and retinal scans have
the ability to reliably scan large databases to identify a random
individual rather than confirming that an individual is the person
claimed. 84 Neither fingerprints nor retinal scans, however, can be
revealed. Jack A. Rovner, Kathryn A. Roe & Ralph L. Glover, Managing the Privacy
Challenge: Compliance with the Amended HIPAA Privacy Rule, 15 Health Law 18 (2002).
These restrictions apply to health insurers, providers, employers engaged in facilitating
health insurance, and related parties. See id. at 21 (describing covered entities and citing
45 C.F.R. §160.103). If it were true that health information could be collected, revealed
and distributed along with biometric data, such regulations could be undermined.
82. See, e.g., Nguyen, supra n. 21, at 4 (noting we are uneasy at having police officers
using technology so powerful that it approaches Big Brother's omnipresence and
omniscience).
83. One could argue that even if biometrics must be collected with knowledge and
consent, biometrics is still more troubling as a tracking device than data such as Social
Security numbers. Society is accustomed to recognizing that Social Security numbers can
be wrong, and more likely to accept biometric data on faith.
84. See supra n. 12 and associated text.
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collected without a party's consent and participation, at least not in
the manner necessary to facilitate large-scale tracking. 5
It is also possible that non-biometric technology could advance
towards allowing surreptitious tracking sooner than biometric
technology. For example, product manufacturers, the Defense
Department, and retailers such as Wal-Mart are in the process of
implementing product tracking systems using tags that send radio
signals." Unlike the familiar bar codes, the tags do not need to be
scanned at close range. A commercial version without a power source
can be read from 20 feet away, while a defense department version
with a power source linked to global positioning satellites can engage
in remote tracking." Such tracking systems potentially allow
government or industry to monitor the location of products without
telling the person wearing or holding the product that it is being
monitored. In addition, for tags with a power source, monitoring
could continue after the product has left the store. The tags are
intended as inventory tracking devices, and industry users are
currently focusing on tagging pallets and cartons of products rather
than tagging individual items.' Nevertheless, the tags raise the
potential of surreptitious tracking through items worn or possessed by
individuals without the use of any biometric information.89
In sum, current biometric technology does not have the capacity
to allow large scale tracking, and large scale tracking may be feasible
through non-biometric measures sooner than through biometrics.
Nevertheless, the potential for the technology to develop towards
large scale tracking in the future raises concerns about the ways in
which government or industry could use the information collected, if
such potential were realized.
85. In some circumstances, fingerprints can be collected surreptitiously by removing
items that an individual has touched. The process, however, does not work in all
circumstances and would not facilitate the type of tracking contemplated in the Orwellian
vision.
86. See Barry J. Feder, That Needle Hopelessly Lost in the Haystack, N.Y. Times C1
(Sep. 29, 2003).
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Privacy advocates have suggested protections such as requiring that products with
embedded tags carry warning labels, that the tags be designed so that they cannot be
reactivated once turned off, and that the tags must be removed unless the buyer agrees to
leave it on. See id. In a more familiar example, cell phone usage can provide surreptitious
information about a person's movements.
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IV. Looking Forward
One theory of the origin of the word "sabotage" suggests that
workers during the Industrial Revolution threw their shoes (sabots)
into the machines in hopes of preventing the march of technology
that was threatening their jobs.9 The effort failed, however, and the
Industrial Revolution continued.
It is always difficult to turn back the tide of technology, and I
suspect one would be no more successful at preventing the use of
biometric technology than the workers were at sabotaging the
machines. We can, however, attempt to impose parameters on the use
of biometrics, parameters that may protect an individual's interest in
the accuracy and appropriate use of biometric information. The
limitations are particularly important to think through before the use
of the technology is fully entrenched because it may be easier to
channel behavior before it becomes habituated in particular
directions.
Biometric information currently is collected by numerous private
and public entities operating under varying types of regulation or lack
thereof. Although it could be useful to standardize requirements
across these disparate circumstances, such a comprehensive approach
is unlikely to occur, particularly not in the short term.9' Nevertheless,
current developments in the implementation of biometric technology
offer a tantalizing opportunity to influence the use and even the
development of biometrics.' Governmental projects involving
widespread implementation of biometrics provide a vehicle for
establishing benchmark standards. Approaches chosen now may set
the stage, not only for the rules that apply to governmental use of
90. David Wilton, Etymologies & Word Origins: Letter S <http://www.wordorigins.
org/wordors.htm> (last updated Jun. 27, 2003).
91. As a comparison, statutory protections concerning the privacy of data about an
individual have not proceeded in a comprehensive fashion in the United States. The
statutes that do exist have tended to focus on the public sector. In contrast, European
efforts have focused on the public and private sectors as a whole. See Stephen R. Salbu,
The European Union Data Privacy Directive & International Relations, 35 Vand. J.
Transnatl. L. 655, 666 (2002). Where regulations do exist in the United States concerning
industry use and collection of data about individuals, such regulations tend to be focused
on particular industries, such as the financial industry, the credit reporting industry, or the
health care industry. See id. at 667; see also Rovner, et al, supra n. 81 (describing the
amended federal HIPAA rules).
92. See e.g., supra text accompanying nn. 2-5 (describing implementation of biometric
technology at all U.S. points of entry); supra text accompanying n. 35 (describing
coordinated effort of state motor vehicle departments to require biometrics for driver's
licenses).
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biometrics in the future, but also for rules that private commercial
entities may implement or that Congress may impose on them.
Most important, given the purchasing power of the government,
the paths chosen today have the potential to affect how the
technology develops. The government as consumer will express its
wishes to the technology suppliers who will attempt to develop the
technology along those lines. This in turn affects our understanding of
what is technologically possible and the choice of rules we can
implement.
Much of the discussion of implementing biometrics revolves
around establishing standards for the reliability of a given technology
and for protection of the data from fraud or misappropriation.93 I
would categorize these efforts as attempts to prevent mistake, fraud
and abuse before the fact. Despite the obvious value of such
initiatives, this should not be our only concern. No matter how much
we invest in prevention of mistake, fraud and abuse, no system is
foolproof. Mistakes will occur, either through technological or human
error. Biometric information will be fraudulently used or altered.
And government agents, intentionally or inadvertently, will violate
whatever rules we establish limiting the use of the biometric
information. Thus, substantial efforts also should be directed at
establishing methods to review and challenge biometric
determinations.
A. Giving Individuals the Opportunity to Review and Challenge
Biometric Determinations
An individual's interest in ensuring the accuracy and proper use
of personal biometric information is unlikely to be fully represented
by other actors in the system. Although one might expect that
government or private organizations would be as interested in
reliable determinations as the individuals who are tested, the interests
may diverge. For example, an organization may use biometric
93. See, e.g., Biometric Identification and the Financial Services Industry, Hearings
Before the House Subcomm. on Domestic and Intl. Monetary Policy of Comm. of Banking
and Financial Services, 105th Cong. (May 20, 1998); H.R. Subcomm. on Technology,
Terrorism, and Govt. Info. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary: Hearing on Biometric
Identifiers and the Modern Face of Terror: New Technologies in the Global War on
Terrorism: 107th Cong. 12, 42 (2001); Jain et al., supra n. 8; John D. Woodward,
Biometrics: Privacy's Foe or Privacy's Friend?, in Biometrics: Personal Identification in
Networked Society 1487 (Anil K. Jain, et al., eds. 1999); Weicheng Shen, Marc Surette, &
Rajiv Khanna, Evaluation of Automated Biometrics-Based Identification and Verification
Systems, in Biometrics: Personal Identification in Networked Society 1487 (Anil K. Jain et
al., eds. 1999); see also Star, supra n. 74, at 7-8; Nguyen, supra n. 21.
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technology, but have very little interest in its reliability. Consider an
organization that requires individuals to put their fingerprint on a
personal check used to purchase traveler's checks. If a fraud
allegation arises, the organization can give the check to the police to
help track down the suspect.9" The organization could decide that the
main value of collecting the biometric lies in the system's ability to
scare off potential defrauders. In other words, those planning to
defraud the organization will see the fingerprint requirement and
choose to perpetrate their fraud elsewhere.
If the main goal is deterrence, rather than confirming the identity
of those who cash checks, the organization could rationally choose to
purchase inexpensive equipment with a low level of reliability. In that
case, the interests of the organization and the individual would not
converge. Individuals would be much more interested in the
reliability of the equipment, given that they must bear the burden of
straightening out errors that occurs. Although the testing entity will
have to invest some time in the mistakes that occur, the potential
damage and resulting burden to the individual of being improperly
investigated by the criminal system are far greater than any burden
the testing entity will bear.
In fact, an individual normally will have a greater interest than
the government or other testing entity in ensuring that his
information is accurate. This would be true almost regardless of the
entity's level of interest in the accuracy of its determination. For
example, although the testing entity may be willing to tolerate a
mistake related to one person out of a thousand, that one person is
likely to have a zero tolerance for mistakes related to himself.
Given the divergence of interests, individuals .should have the
ability to serve as watchdogs for their own information to confirm its
accuracy and appropriate use. In particular, procedures should be
established allowing individuals to periodically check and correct
their biometric information in the same way that individuals can
check and correct their credit status." Although lay people currently
do not have the ability to analyze raw biometric data and its
implications, if access were granted, one would expect a market to
develop in products or services designed for this purpose.
94. The California State Automobile Association currently has such a procedure.
95. Procedures for correcting inaccuracies detected through periodic review could
follow the path outlined below for general rules for challenging biometrics. See infra text
accompanying nn. 113-15.
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The greater challenge will be to delineate procedures for
individuals who wish to challenge a biometric determination made in
the course of a denial of rights or privileges. Such a challenge could
take the form of arguing that the biometric is inaccurate or that the
conclusions drawn from the biometric are inaccurate.
As described above, biometric determinations raise greater
concerns than other forms of identification in light of our potential to
blindly accept the accuracy of the information and discount the
possibility of error, as well as the danger that we will transpose this
certainty about identification into certainty about a person's past or
future behavior. Given the difficulty of challenging information
cloaked in the mantle of scientific truth, one could argue that the
governmental agency should bear the burden of proving the accuracy
of its determination, rather than the individual bearing the burden to
prove that the information is wrong. This is consistent with the fact
that, as between the agency and the individual, the agency has better
access to the information that would determine whether inaccuracies
exist. Nevertheless, insisting that government agencies shoulder the
burden of proving the accuracy of every biometric determination
could result in a crushing administrative burden and interfere with the
legitimate exercise of governmental interests. The goal will be to
balance these competing interests in the context of government action
based on biometrics.
An individual's right to challenge government action generally is
governed by due process doctrines. The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that government shall not deprive an individual
of liberty or property without due process of law. Thus, the question
for biometric determinations will be whether the resulting
government action constitutes a deprivation of liberty or property
and, if so, what process is due.
The notion of a deprivation of liberty is not limited to the types
of formal constraints imposed by the criminal process. 96 Although
incarceration may be an extreme form of deprivation of liberty, the
Supreme Court has found liberty interests implicated when
government action may harm an individual's standing and reputation
in the community. For example, in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath (1951), the Court found a liberty interest
involved in the federal government's designation of certain
organizations as "Communist. '" 97 Similarly, in Wisconsin v.
96. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
97. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
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Constantineau (1971), the Court found a liberty interest involved in
an ordinance providing that local police could publicly distribute lists
of individuals not permitted to purchase alcohol.98
Due process doctrines, however, do not prevent the government
from acting whenever the action may harm an individual's liberty
interest. Rather, deprivation of a liberty interest brings to bear the
requirement that the governmental body act according to appropriate
procedures and afford the individual an opportunity to be heard and
to challenge the government's determination. 9 In addition, in at least
one case involving deprivation of liberty interests, the Supreme Court
construed due process as requiring notice and an opportunity to be
heard prior to the government's action.' °°
Analogous to deprivations of liberty, the notion of a deprivation
of property is not limited to traditional notions of land or tangible
items confiscated by the government. The Supreme Court has found
property interests implicated in termination of government privileges
such as disability benefits and welfare payments. '°'
Unlike deprivation of liberty, however, deprivation of a property
interest does not necessarily require notice and an opportunity to be
heard prior to the deprivation. Thus, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the
Supreme Court found no pre-termination hearing necessary for
termination of the complainant's disability benefits." The Eldridge
Court based its determination on consideration of 3 factors: 1) the
private interest that would be affected by the official action; 2) the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest and the value of any
additional safeguards; and 3) the government's interest in the
function involved, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that
additional procedures would create.
3
Logic from the liberty and property lines of cases may suggest a
framework for challenges to biometric determinations by government
98. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
99. For the federal government, modern due process requirements are grounded in
statutory law as well as constitutional law. See 5 U.S.C. § 556 (2000).
100. See Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 437 (finding that when a person's good name,
reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,
notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential).
101. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263
(1970).
102. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 319. (arguably the high water mark of due process rights for
termination of government benefits, the Supreme Court did require a pre-termination
hearing, although the Court explained that the requirement could be satisfied by
something short of a full judicial inquiry) See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266-67.
103. See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 321.
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entities. Consider, for example, an individual traveler moving through
the security line at the San Francisco airport. The traveler's biometric
is scanned and matched to relevant travel documents and to the
government database. Suppose the traveler is informed that he will
not be allowed to board the plane. What procedures should exist to
challenge the biometric determination?
Answering the question begins with identifying the type of
interests the disappointed traveler can claim and considering the
strength of those interests in comparison to ones that have been
protected as liberty or property interests. The disappointed traveler
may be able to argue that the government's action implicates a liberty
interest by damaging his reputation and standing in the community.
Family members and business associates traveling with him will know
of the government's refusal to allow the traveler on the plane. They
may reasonably infer that the government believes this person
represents an unacceptable risk of some kind, a judgment that may
affect their willingness to trust and associate with the traveler. '°"
The government's action, however, is less intrusive into the
traveler's standing in the community than the government actions in
the liberty cases that involve posting lists for public consumption.0 5 In
particular, the traveler's information is not trumpeted to the
community at large. Although those who receive the information by
incidental contact may make assumptions that are damaging to the
individual's reputation, if the government does not publicly announce
a damaging reason for the denial,"°  bystanders are free to draw less
104. The traveler potentially could claim deprivation of a property interest on the
grounds that he is denied the ability to exercise the value of his plane ticket. Given that
the amount of process due may depend on the type of interest and the strength of that
interest, however, the property claim would be considerably weaker than the deprivation
of liberty claim. One would imagine that the process due for the loss of a plane ticket
would be less than the process due for the loss of reputation.
105. The McGrath and Constantineau cases both involved public postings of
information. In Constantineau, the chief of police distributed a list of names to liquor
store owners noting that those individuals should not be allowed to purchase alcohol. 400
U.S. at 433. In McGrath, the organizations' names were published in the federal register.
341 U.S. at 129 n. 3. One could argue, however, that the McGrath case concerned less
than public posting. The publication in the Federal Register included the names of the
organizations rather than the members of the organization. The list containing individual
names, however, was distributed to public agencies and departments for the purposes of
denying employment. From this perspective, the McGrath "no-employment" list
distributed to agencies involved in government hiring could be analogized to a "no-fly" list
distributed to agencies involved in airport security.
106. Drawing the line based on the level of public disclosure presents some difficulties.
For example, the traveler will undoubtedly want to know the reason for the denial. From
a policy standpoint, we would want the government to provide information so that the
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damaging conclusions, such as expiration of documents or ticketingproblems.' °7
Nevertheless, in all likelihood, the denial of access will have a
practical effect on the traveler's reputation. Those who know of the
denial are likely to assume the worst. In addition, once the traveler
knows he will be rejected, it will be difficult to conceal his "no-fly"
status from friends and business associates in the future. There are
only a limited number of excuses one can offer for an inability to
travel by plane. Thus, denial of access to the plane may affect the
traveler's standing in the community, thereby implicating a liberty
interest.
The traveler also could argue that he has a liberty interest in
moving throughout the country. Denial of access to the plane may
implicate his freedom of movement, which could be interpreted as a
deprivation of liberty. Again, the fact that the government action
implicates a liberty interest would not prevent the government from
acting in this manner," but could suggest that process rights may
attach, depending on issues such as the nature of the interest
involved, the competing governmental interest, and a comparison of
the potential benefit to be gained by adding more procedures verses
the fiscal and administrative burden of those procedures.' °
The governmental interest in applying biometric technology will
vary according to the use for which the information is intended. In
evaluating the strength of the interest for the purposes of identifying
a proper review process, however, it is important to consider the risk
that the review process will lead to a mistaken result in favor of the
traveler can challenge inaccuracies. The goal of due process is to allow an individual to
have notice and an opportunity to be heard. One cannot effectively be heard if one has no
idea of the reason for the denial. This, however, poses a dilemma for the government.
First, we tell the government to provide information on the reason for the denial. Next,
we tell the government that if it provides information on the reason for the denial, it will
be branding the individual in the eyes of the community, thereby giving the government
an incentive to provide no information at the time of the denial. The clash of dictates
could produce an odd dance in which the security agent refuses to speak and insists on
silently thrusting legal documents at the traveler. Alternatively, the traveler could end up
having to waive his rights in order to receive the information.
107. Cf Roth, 408 U.S. at 573 (declining to find a liberty interest in a case in which the
government did not rehire the claimant on the grounds that the state did not make any
charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in the
community).
108. The government has the legitimate power to restrict movement in many ways
ranging from traffic laws that slightly restrict movement to laws of incarceration that
drastically restrict movement.
109. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 at 163 (liberty case); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 321 (property
case).
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individual. Just as biometrics are fallible, so are review processes.
Both processes may make mistakes in favor of the individual as well
as against the individual. In designating a review system, one must
consider the potential harm if the review process reaches a mistaken
result in favor of the individual.
In the case of immediate access to an airplane, the potential
harm is great. As exemplified by the events of September 11, a small
number of individuals with access to a commercial airliner can cause
astounding destruction. Although the likelihood is small that any
individual traveler boarding a plane poses a threat, the magnitude of
the harm is great in those rare circumstances in which the individual
does pose a threat.
The magnitude of the potential harm suggests a strong
governmental interest. Nevertheless, the problem remains that the
data may be wrong or the assumptions drawn from the underlying
data may be incorrect. Thus, even in circumstances that present more
extreme examples of security considerations, individuals will need the
opportunity to challenge the determination. The more difficult
questions concern the type of challenge that should be permitted and
whether that challenge must occur before the deprivation. In other
words, must the government give the traveler a hearing before the
traveler can be denied access to the plane or will a post-deprivation
hearing suffice?
The question can be framed in terms of a cost/benefit analysis. If
one were to require a pre-deprivation hearing, how much error
avoidance would be gained and at what administrative cost? A small
amount of error avoidance, for example, at a great administrative cost
would be unappealing.
It would be difficult to design an effective pre-deprivation
hearing for the traveler. Suppose the facial imaging system identifies
the traveler as Joe Smith, but the traveler says, "I am not Joe Smith."
For an effective hearing, one would need to gather and evaluate a
wide range of information, much of which would not be readily
available at the airport. For example, if the traveler is not Joe Smith,
reasons for the error could include 1) an error by the person who
entered the original data about Joe Smith; 2) a programming error; 3)
the natural error rate of the technology; 4) fraud in the system or 5)
other possible computer or human errors. None of these problems
could be efficiently investigated at the airport, particularly not before
the scheduled departure time.
The inquiry would be even more difficult if the traveler
dtck1uw1dges that he is Joe Smith but challenges the government's
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determination that he should be denied access to the plane. The
information leading to the government's determination could be
subject to procedures to protect secrecy and confidentiality. It would
be difficult to keep such procedures in place while exploring the
accuracy and validity of the government's determination in a short
time period. Moreover, a measured evaluation of the validity of the
government's judgment would be difficult to accomplish under tight
time constraints."0
One could argue that the burden of the tight time constraints
should fall on the government rather than the individual. If the
government cannot adequately make its case during the short time
period, the individual should be allowed to fly, and the government
could proceed with a fuller inquiry at a later time. This, however,
would produce a policy of "fly now, ask questions later," which would
be decidedly ineffective against suicide bombers. Again, the
magnitude of the potential harm weighs in favor of greater latitude
for the government at the moment of departure."
Thus, a pre-deprivation hearing would encounter extraordinarily
difficult problems. The time is short, the necessary information is not
readily available, and the public safety danger is great. This makes it
difficult to design an effective pre-deprivation hearing that would buy
110. One could also argue that a proper hearing would have advocates on both sides.
It would be unrealistic to expect that travelers and security agents could summon lawyers
to the airport at a moment's notice. In theory, one could grant the traveler the right at the
time of departure to require that the government show that it has followed proper
procedures in making the determination without requiring the government to reveal any
information relied upon. This would grant the traveler a limited pre-deprivation right that
could be coupled with the right for a more extensive challenge at a later time. Such a due
process right, however, is unlikely to provide much benefit to the traveler, other than to
help ensure that the government actually has a procedure for making determinations.
One would expect, however, that post-deprivation review would suffice to give the
government the proper incentive for establishing reasonable procedures and that such a
pre-deprivation right would add little benefit.
111. One could argue that the time limitation problems could be solved by requiring
the government to notify individuals who will be designated for additional security or
denied access altogether. Prior notification could theoretically allow time for a more
leisurely inquiry into the adequacy of the determination. The administrative burden of an
effective system of notification would be great. It would require the government to collect
and track current address information on the legions of travelers who come through the
system. Ironically, although this requirement might appear to be directed at protecting
individual rights, it would raise libertarian concerns by mandating increased government
tracking and data collection. In addition, many of the individuals will be foreign visitors,
greatly complicating the task. One could require only that the government make some
effort at notification, allowing notification by publication, for example. Such notification
would be fairly ineffective as a method of truly notifying the individuals implicated. Thus,
although the latter approach would lower administrative costs, the amount of error
correction would be low.
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much error avoidance, particularly one that would not impose an
unreasonably high administrative burden.
One could argue that a full-blown hearing is not necessary, at
least in cases in which the traveler denies that he is Joe Smith.
Perhaps the traveler should at least be entitled to display documents
contradicting the determination that he is Joe Smith and on that basis,
board the plane. A key advantage of biometrics, however, is that they
are more difficult to falsify than documents. It would undermine the
purpose of biometrics to allow a biometric determination to be
overturned on the spot by less trustworthy documents. Those
documents, nevertheless, could form the basis of a challenge to the
biometric determination in a less time-sensitive and more complete
forum at a later time.
The disappointed traveler hypothetical is drawn broadly and
simply. In an alternative scenario, an individual already in this
country is not denied access to a plane but is designated for additional
security reviews. Under those circumstances, the government action
may implicate Fourth Amendment protections related to government
search and seizure, an issue outside the scope of this article.112 In
addition to potential Fourth Amendment issues, however,
designation for additional security review could still implicate liberty
interests on the grounds that increased scrutiny creates harm to
reputation. If an individual is repeatedly subjected to security
reviews, friends and colleagues who witness the heightened security
or hear about it may regard the traveler with suspicion and avoid
personal or business association."3
In sum, the case of the disappointed traveler falls somewhere
between the government entitlement cases and the deprivation of
liberty cases. The possibility that the traveler is branded as presenting
a risk to a civilized traveling society may give the traveler a liberty
interest, stronger than the quasi-property interest held by an
individual who merely seeks access to a government benefit or
privilege. Nevertheless, the potential harm from allowing improper
airport access is great, making the government interest quite strong.
112. For discussions of biometrics and the Fourth Amendment, see Slobogin, supra n.
74; Nguyen, supra n. 21; Star, supra n. 74.
113. One could argue that with a proper search, the government need never deny
access. Suppose, for example, that an individual agrees to allow an extensive search of his
person and luggage. If nothing dangerous is revealed, perhaps the government's concern
for potential harm should be fully satisfied. The government could respond, however, that
it can never fully anticipate the next generation of weapons and the next wave of threats.
NA--, th n-oPrnmPnt'q innhility to keen weanons out of jails despite extensive and
intrusive searches, casts doubt on the notion that a search can be fully adequate.
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The magnitude of the danger and efficiency limitations suggest that
an individual's right to challenge the determination at the time of the
denial may not be great, although the individual may retain an
interest in challenging the determination in a more measured forum
after the fact."'
An important part of the solution will lie in a careful calibration
of the burdens at the subsequent hearing. While we may wish to avoid
imposing an overwhelming administrative burden on the government,
the government is in the better position to access information about
biometric inaccuracies and enjoys the psychological advantage of a
presumption of accuracy. We may therefore wish to place an initial
burden on the individual to make a limited showing of mistake or
inadequacy of a biometric determination with the burden shifting to
the government to prove the adequacy of its conclusions.
As a general matter, the proper process for challenging a
biometric determination will vary based on the nature and
circumstances of the denial. Nevertheless, parameters that emerge
from the example of the disappointed traveler may suggest rules for
challenging biometric determinations made in a variety of
circumstances. First, it will be important to provide an effective
opportunity to challenge government denials based on biometrics,
although the opportunity need not necessarily occur prior to the
denial. This approach would respect both the individual's interest in
the accuracy and proper use of his biometric information as well as
the government's interest in immediate security. Second, placing the
initial burden on the individual and then shifting the burden to the
government may strike a balance between the individual's
disadvantages in the system of biometric determinations and the need
for administrative efficiency1"5
114. Cf. North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (no pre-
deprivation hearing necessary for destruction of potentially tainted meat given public
health and safety concerns).
115. The rules outlined for due process in challenging biometric information could
also be considered for challenging government identification and verification data in
general. The bias towards scientific evidence, however, would weigh less heavily in the
general data cases, which might affect the allocation of the burdens or the level of the
burden applied.
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B. Representing the Interests of the Individual in Developing Governmental
Policies
As described above, current initiatives offer an important
opportunity for shaping the rules that will govern biometric
technology far into the future. For the protection of individual
interests, it will be important to ensure that individuals are properly
represented in the administrative process that leads to
implementation of the biometric technology and the development of
rules for its use. One cannot reasonably expect government agencies
to fully represent the interests of the individual for several reasons.
First, policy making may be biased in favor of concentrated interests.
Such concentrated interests, including those who create and market
the technology as well as private commercial entities that use
biometrics, may overshadow the interests of the individual. More
importantly, government agencies are themselves stakeholders in the
process. They are both consumers of biometric products and
implementers of biometric determinations. As such, the agencies will
have their own biases based on their potential needs.
In response to this problem, governmental groups designated to
choose biometric technologies and implement rules for biometric
determinations ideally should include those who can fully represent
the interests of the individual. The need is not necessarily satisfied by
the inclusion of academics. For example, academics in fields related
to developing biometrics technology will be well-suited to
consultation on evaluating technology and minimizing the risk of
error. Representatives of consumer groups, however, may be better
suited for consultation on the rules for limiting the damage from the
inevitable errors.
V. Conclusion
Biometric technology promises a revolution in the level of
convenience, accuracy and security of personal identification and
verification. As we embrace the technology, however, we should
pause to consider some of the implications of its widespread
implementation. Despite the remarkable level of improvement, the
results are still subject to error, both through mistake as well as fraud
or abuse. The greatest concern, however, is not the potential for error
but rather society's potential reluctance to accept the possibility of
error and the resulting barriers for those who are incorrectly
identified. In light of these concerns, we should direct attention not
only at preventing fraud, mistake, ano atuse before tic I du, Lu. als,
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at establishing methods to detect their inevitable occurrence and to
limit the resulting damage. To this end, we should take this
opportunity to ensure that individuals have adequate procedures for
challenging biometric determinations and that individual interests are
well represented in the development of governmental policies
surrounding biometrics.
